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ECRA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. INTRODUCTION
In New Jersey, a conflict occurs when property from a bankrupt es-
tate qualifies as an "industrial establishment"' under the Environmen-
tal Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA).2 How must the trustee in
bankruptcy respond to comply with the appropriate law? According to
ECRA, violations for noncompliance "constitute a lien or claim which
may be limited or discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding.",3 Further-
more, all obligations resulting from such violations "constitute contin-
uing regulatory obligations."4 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19785
was enacted generally to "provide for an equitable settling of creditors'
accounts by usurping from the debtor his power to control the distribu-
tion of his assets.",6 ECRA was enacted "to protect the citizens and
environment of New Jersey from the harmful effects of improperly con-
trolled hazardous substances."'7 When a trustee in bankruptcy trans-
fers assets in violation of ECRA, a highly controversial conflict
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-8(f) (West Supp. 1988) provides: "'Industrial Estab-
lishment' means any place of business engaged in operations which involve the genera-
tion, manufacturer, refining, transportation, treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of
hazardous substances or wastes on-site, above or below ground ..... See also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:1K-9 (West Supp. 1988) for the duties and obligations that the statute places
upon owners or operators of industrial establishments planning to close, sell, or transfer
operations.
2. Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 to -13
(West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter ECRA].
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-12, (West Supp. 1988); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
7, § 26B-14.1(b) (1987).
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:IK-12 (West Supp. 1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1979).
6. In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912, 915 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom
Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, reh'g
denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).
7. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-7 (West Supp. 1988). See also Long, New Jersey's En-
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between the two policies may result.8
B. DOES THE BANKRUPTCY CODE PREEMPT ECRA?
Although courts have broadly construed a state's police power to
promote legitimate public policy, federal law always preempts state law
when the two directly conflict.9 An important issue under ECRA is
whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts in its entirety the effects of
ECRA when both are applied to an estate in bankruptcy.
Because ECRA is a relatively new statute,1° there is very little case
law interpreting it. This makes subsequent litigation highly unpredict-
able. In re Borne Chemical, Inc. 1 is the only case that has addressed
the conflict between bankruptcy law and ECRA. In Borne, the debtor-
in-possession, pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, sought
judicial approval to transfer two parcels of land without complying
with ECRA."2 Parcels "A" and "B" were littered with hazardous
waste that severely lessened the land's market value. 13 The sale was
part of a plan to provide funds for reorganization.4
The debtor maintained that the federal Bankruptcy Code should pre-
empt the ECRA bankruptcy provision 5 under the supremacy clause of
the Constitution.16 The court applied the preemption test set forth in
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Commission.17 The Borne court determined that no
vironmental Cleanup Responsibility Act: An Innovative Approach to Environmental Reg-
ulation, 90 DICK. L. Rev. 159, 192 (1985).
8. See infra notes 15-20.
9. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971) (setting forth a two-step process
for determining preemption questions: first, construe the statutes to discover their pur-
poses; second, determine if state law interferes with the objectives of federal law); see
also infra notes 15-20.
10. The law became effective December 31, 1983.
11. 54 Bankr. 126 (D. N.J. 1984).
12. Id at 128. See also Long, supra note 7, at 192.
13. 54 Bankr. at 128.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 128-29. The federal Bankruptcy Code is cited in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
16. 54 Bankr. at 129; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. 461 U.S. 190 (1983). This decision refined and explained the law of preemption
as set forth in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). See supra note 9 for presen-
tation of Perez preemption test. In Pacific Gas, the Court presented an overview of
preemption standards:
It is well established that within Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state
authority by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519
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Bankruptcy Code provision explicitly and directly provides that the
Code supersedes all state law. The court also held that the Code is not
so pervasive that it precludes enforcement of state law governing the
sale of property.18 Since it was possible to comply with both the fed-
eral and state legislation, ECRA was not preempted under the "physi-
cal impossibility" rule, 9 which provides that a federal law or
regulation preempts state law "where compliance with both ... is a
physical impossibility."'2 Accordingly, the court permitted the debtor
to sell the property only after it had complied with ECRA regula-
tions.2' In response, Borne Chemical sought to abandon Parcel B and
(1977).... Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress' intent to supersede
state law altogether may be found from a "scheme of federal regulation so perva-
sive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement
it," "because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject," or because "the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same
purpose." Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
148 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Even where
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is
preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict
arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical im-
possibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963), or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
54 Bankr. at 130 (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04). See also Note, The Environ-
mental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA): New Accountability for Industrial Landown-
ers in New Jersey, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 349-50 n.l10 (1985).
18. 54 Bankr. at 130. The court quoted Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159, 163 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983): "[It] is fundamental that the state and
federal legislatures share concurrent authority to promulgate bankruptcy laws." Id.
Furthermore, the Borne court observed that the Bankruptcy Code specifically provides
for the application of state bankruptcy law, or state law in general, citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1982) (state law bankruptcy exemptions) and 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982)
(trustee or debtor in possession shall manage or operate property in accordance with
state law where it is situated). See Note, supra note 17, at 350 n.112.
19. 54 Bankr. at 130. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142 (1963). An example of physical impossibility would be a case where federal law
prohibits the marketing of avocados having a seven percent oil content and the state
regulation excludes from the state any avocado having less than an eight percent oil
content. Id. at 143. The Borne court concluded that such an impossibility did not exist
in the instant case. 54 Bankr. at 130. See Note, supra note 17, at 350 n.1 14.
20. 373 U.S. at 142.
21. 54 Bankr. at 132.
1989]
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to cease operations on Parcel A without complying with ECRA.2 2
C. MAY A BANKRUPT DEBTOR IGNORE ECRA AND ABANDON
BURDENSOME PROPERTY?
If the bankrupt estate does not have the resources to clean up the
noncomplying land, ECRA may be an obstacle to the sale of prop-
erty.23 Cleanup costs generally constitute the majority of ECRA com-
pliance expenses.2 4 While ECRA allows the transferee to assume these
costs,25 the transferee may not assume the expensive procedure of pre-
liminary notice.
2 6
Although the Borne court prohibited the precompliance sale of the
two contaminated parcels, it did allow the debtor to abandon one par-
cel and cease operations on the other.27 The court based its decision on
section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a trustee to aban-
don any property that is burdensome to the estate.28 Finding Parcel B
burdensome because of its environmental problems, the Borne court
allowed its abandonment.29
The Borne court based its decision on the holding in In re Quanta
Resources Corp.30 In Quanta, a non-ECRA case, the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the transferee
could abandon burdensome property contaminated with hazardous
waste even though abandonment would violate environmental statutes
regulating the disposal of hazardous waste.3 1 Accordingly, the Borne
court granted the trustee's motion to abandon Parcel B without com-
22. Id. at 134-35.
23. Id. at 131.
24. See Note, supra note 17, at 351.
25. 54 Bankr. at 131 n.l. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:lK-9(3)(c) (West Supp. 1988);
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26B-5.1 to -5.8 (1987).
26. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9 (West Supp. 1988); see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
7, §§ 26B-3.1 to -3.5 (1987).
27. 54 Bankr. at 135. See also Note, supra note 17, at 351.
28. Borne qualified as a trustee in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
29. 54 Bankr. at 134.
30. 55 Bankr. 696 (D.C. N.J. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat. Bank v.
N. J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1985).
31. 55 Bankr. at 698-99. The district court in New York allowed the trustee in
bankruptcy to abandon property which stored at least 70,000 gallons of contaminated
oil. The State of New York argued that such abandonment was a prohibited disposal of
hazardous waste under state law. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982). See also Note, supra note 17, at 352 & n.122.
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plying with ECRA.32
To complicate matters, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed Quanta after Borne was decided. The court
found that "enforcement of state public health and safety laws is not
superseded by the abandonment power contained in section 554 of the
Bankruptcy Code.",33 The Third Circuit relied on congressional intent
at the time of enactment of the abandonment provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 4 Prior case law revealed no legislative intent to grant a
trustee abandonment power unrestricted by public health and safety
regulation.35 To the contrary, precedent showed that Congress in-
tended to defer to state police powers. 36 In addition, the court scruti-
nized sections 554(a) and 959(b) and found that the Code was not
enacted to abrogate relevant state laws.37 Indeed, one court found that
32. 54 Bankr. at 135.
33. In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 927 (1984), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat.
Bank v. N. J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). The court adopted its
rationale in the decision of a companion Quanta case, which involved the State of New
York. See In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912 (1984).
34. 739 F.2d at 915-16. Congressional intent to withdraw police power from a state
must be unmistakable. Id. at 916.
35. Id. at 915-22. The court began its analysis with the following general proposi-
tions: (1) there is a basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law,
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); (2) where it is argued that Congress
intended to withdraw police power from the state, that intention must be unmistakable,
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); and (3)
although there has been no express recognition of the abandonment power in the pre-
1978 bankruptcy statute, courts approved the exercise of such a power subject to the
application of general regulations of a police nature, 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
para. 70.42, at 502-04 (14th ed. 1978). 739 F.2d at 916. See also Note, supra note 17, at
353 n.129.
36. 739 F.2d at 920.
37. 739 F.2d at 918-21. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 959(b) (1982). See also Note,
supra note 17, at 354 n.132. The Court found that, in light of other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code that limit the supersession of state laws and specifically incorporate
equity principles into a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, it was clear that § 554 did not
itself preempt state police power regulations. 739 F.2d at 918.
In support of the proposition that Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to
generally abrogate the enforcement of state police power regulation, the Third Circuit
first cited the express exception to the automatic stay provision. Id. That provision
halts all actions against the debtor for "the commencement or continuation of an action
or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or
regulatory power." Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982)). This is the same preemp-
tion analysis applied in part by the Borne court in deciding not to allow the sale of two
parcels of the debtor's property.
The Third Circuit also relied on 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) in support of this proposition. 739
F.2d at 919. Implicit in § 959(b) is the notion that the goals of the federal bankruptcy
1989]
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"Congress has recently recognized in an express fashion its intention
that public interest regulations are to outweigh that of the Bankruptcy
Act and Rules in the case of conflict.",31
Ultimately, the court deemed that bankruptcy proceedings were eq-
uitable and therefore required a balancing of the federal and state inter-
ests. 39 The court weighed the state's interest in "protecting the public
health and regulating disposal of hazardous waste" against the federal
policy of "providing for an equitable settling of creditors' accounts by
preserving for distribution as much of the estate as possible."40 Finding
in favor of the state's interest, the Third Circuit held that the burden of
large expenditures inherent in compliance with state waste disposal
laws was not sufficient in itself to outweigh the public interest at
stake.41 Absent a clear indication that Congress intended to allow the
substitution of governmental action for citizen compliance, equitable
principles prompted the court to prohibit abandonment. The court
thus relieved the government of its responsibility for cleanup, and en-
forced individual compliance with state environment laws.42
laws do not authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements for the operation
of business, even if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted by apply-
ing state laws. 739 F.2d at 919. The court recognized that the language of § 959(b),
"manage[ment] and oper[ation]" of the "property," could be read broadly to include
abandonment or narrowly to mean only the administration of the business as a going
concern. Id. The court concluded, however, that "at the very least, the existence of
§ 959(b) indicates that Congress has not 'unmistakenly ordained' that state law is super-
seded by the trustee's powers to administer the property of the estate." 739 F.2d at 920.
38. In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D. P.R. 1979) (citing
§ 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code).
39. 739 F.2d at 921. See also Long, supra note 7, at 194.
40. 739 F.2d at 921. The court indicated that this bankruptcy policy must be
viewed in light of concurrent federal legislative policy which limits federal intrusion into
state police power regulations, including environmental protection laws. Id See also
Note, supra note 17, at 354 n.135.
41. 739 F.2d at 921. See also Note, supra note 17, at 354 n.132.
42. 739 F.2d at 921-22. See also Note, supra note 17, at 354 n.137. The court
warned that if trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose of hazardous wastes
under the "cloak" of the abandonment power, compliance with environmental protec-
tion laws will be transformed into "government cleanup by default." 739 F.2d at 921.
The bankruptcy laws, therefore, were not intended to create such a radical change in the
nature of local public health and safety regulation (the substitute of government action
for citizen compliance) without an indication that Congress so intended. Id. at 922. In
support of this proposition, the court cites the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, which requires those parties responsi-
ble for the disposal of hazardous waste to reimburse the government for the cost of
emergency cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). One of the objectives of imposing liability
is "to induce such [liable] persons to voluntarily pursue appropriate environmental re-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/16
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The Borne court relied heavily on the district court's reasoning in
Quanta.4 3 The Third Circuit's reversal certainly means that a reversal
of Borne Chemical's grant to abandon is imminent on appeal. A rever-
sal of Borne will strike a blow in favor of state efforts to correct hazard-
ous waste contamination. As Borne stands presently, a transferor can
easily circumvent ECRA by petitioning for bankruptcy. Violators can
pollute the land and seek refuge under the Bankruptcy Code when
their duty to cleanup the site arises. A successful appeal of Borne will
close this judicial loophole and warn ECRA violators that their indis-
cretions will be costly. If Borne is overturned, the law will be more
predictable; other states, therefore, may be more likely to enact their
own ECRA-like statutes.
Finally, the Borne court considered whether Borne Chemical could
cease operations of Parcel A without complying with ECRA.44 Section
959(b) requires a debtor in possession to "manage and operate prop-
erty... according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in
which such property is situated."4 Although the Third Circuit never
directly addressed this issue, its broad interpretation of section 959(b)
in the abandonment context may lead to a reversal of the Borne court's
decision to permit the cessation of operations on Parcel A.4 If the
court interprets abandonment as cessation of operations, then the
Borne court's grant to the debtor to allow cessation of Parcel A with-
out compliance with ECRA is susceptible to reversal on appeal.
D. MAY A DEBTOR DISCHARGE ECRA LIABILITY
IN BANKRUPTCY?
Section 727(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to discharge
certain "claims" or "debts" in bankruptcy. 47 In Ohio v. Kovacs," the
sponse actions with respect to inactive waste sites." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. I at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120.
43. In re Borne Chemical, Inc., 54 Bankr. 126, 128 (D. N.J. 1984).
44. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
46. See Note, supra note 17, at 356.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982). Under § 524(a), a bank-
ruptcy discharge erases the bankrupt's "debt," which is defined as "liability on a claim."
11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982). A "claim" is defined as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
19891
Washington University Open Scholarship
280 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 35:273
Supreme Court addressed whether a state judgment requiring an indi-
vidual debtor to clean up a hazardous waste site is a dischargeable
"claim" or "debt."'49
In Kovacs, the State of Ohio argued that the legislative history of the
bankruptcy provision did not allow the court to classify an equitable
remedy as a "claim" unless the plaintiff sought a remedy for a breach
of performance.5" Such a breach also permitted an alternative right to
payment.5" Accordingly, the State maintained that Kovacs' obligation
to clean up stemmed from a violation of law, not a "breach-of perform-
ance.""2 The State also claimed that there was no alternative right to
payment, only a right to effect the cleanup order.53
The Bankruptcy Court and the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio was urg-
ing Kovacs to finance the cleanup in order to enforce an alternative
right to payment54 and to obtain compensation for the state's pecuni-
ary losses.55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's judg-
ment that Kovacs' obligation was a "claim" or "debt" dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
56
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding and found
that under state law Ohio had the right to an equitable remedy, in this
case an injunction ordering cleanup.57 Furthermore, the Court held
rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
secured, or secured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
48. 469 U.S. 274 (1988).
49. Id at 275.





54. 29 Bankr. 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
55. 469 U.S. 274.
56. Id at 277.
57. Id. at 284-85. The decision should be limited to its facts because the Court em-
phasized the narrowness of its holding. Id. The Court pointed out that Kovacs still
would be subject to criminal prosecution for the original violation and to contempt
proceedings for failing to comply with the state court orders. Id. Moreover, the Court
did not decide what the legal consequences would have been if Kovacs had filed his
bankruptcy petition before the appointment of the receiver. In that situation, a bank-
ruptcy trustee would have had the various powers and duties authorized by the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id The Court emphasized that its decision addressed only the
dischargeability of the affirmative duty to clean up the site and to pay money for the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol35/iss1/16
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that Kovacs' cleanup duty was reduced to a monetary obligation be-
cause the receiver was in control of the site and Kovacs was dispos-
sessed.5 8 Thus, Kovacs could discharge the obligation in bankruptcy.
Although the Kovacs decision apparently diminished the potency of
state toxic waste legislation, Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, de-
scribed how states can mitigate, indeed eliminate, the problems Kovacs
appears to create.59 Ohio claimed that the Kovacs decision would fa-
tally hinder state environmental laws.' O'Connor emphasized that the
Court's holding "cannot be viewed as hostile to state enforcement of
environmental laws."6 1 Substantial recourse remains for states to pro-
cleanup. The Court's decision did not address the dischargeability of the state court
injunctions against contributing further to the pollution or bringing toxic wastes to the
site. Id.
Finally, the Court admitted that any person in possession of the site must comply
with Ohio's environmental regulations and could not refuse to remove the source of the
pollution. Id. The only parties that the Court lists, however, are Kovacs or anyone
receiving the property upon abandonment, or a vendee from the trustee or receiver. Id.
The Court made no mention of the trustee's obligation to comply with state laws. Id.
Cf 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1968) (trustee must "operate and maintain" business in compli-
ance with state laws.) See Note, Belly Up Down in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazard-
ous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1037, 1053 n.98 (1985).
58. 469 U.S. 274. See also Note, supra note 17, at 357. The Court quoted a portion
of the Sixth Circuit's opinion:
Ohio does not suggest that Kovacs is capable of personally cleaning up the environ-
mental damage he may have caused. Ohio claims there is no alternative right to
payment, but when Kovacs failed to perform, state law gave a state receiver total
control over all Kovac's assets. Ohio later used state law to try and discover
Kovac's post-petition income and employment status in an apparent attempt to
levy on his future earnings. In reality, the only type of performance in which Ohio
is now interested is a money payment to effectuate the.., cleanup.... The impact
of [the State's] attempt to realize upon Kovacs' income or property cannot be con-
cealed by legerdemain or linguistic gymnastics. Kovacs cannot personally clean up
the waste he wrongfully released into Ohio waters. He cannot perform the affirma-
tive obligation properly imposed upon him by the State Court except by paying
money or transferring over his own financial resources. The State of Ohio has
acknowledged this by its steadfast pursuit of payment as an alternative to personal
performance.
In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 987 (1983).
59. 469 U.S. 285-86.
60. Id at 282.
61. Id at 286. Justice O'Connor recognized that "[b]ecause 'Congress has generally
left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state
interest as a lien on the property itself, a perfected security interest or merely an un-
secured claim depends on Ohio law." Id at 285-86. This statement should serve as a
strong recommendation to states that wish to protect their interests in enforcing envi-
ronmental laws. See Note, supra note 17, at 153.
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tect their own interests.62 If state law classifies cleanup judgments as
statutory liens or secured claims, a state's interest in the debtor's assets
is given priority over other creditors.63 Therefore, New Jersey and
states wishing to enact ECRA-like statutes would be advised to enact
companion legislation to fill the gap opened by the Kovacs Court. Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion can be read as an admonition to
state legislatures. Legislative action in this respect allows Kovacs and
the dischargeability provision in the Bankruptcy Code to remain con-
sistent with the preemption and abandonment issues mentioned above.
Furthermore, this consistency will act as an impetus for other states to
enact hazardous waste laws.
E. CONCLUSION
Courts normally grant states great deference to regulate public
health and welfare via the state's police power. Absent an overwhelm-
ing federal interest, courts should allow New Jersey to regulate its toxic
waste disposal without hindrance from federal legislation. Due to the
severity of its toxic waste problem, New Jersey is at the forefront of
toxic waste legislation. Other states confronting the toxic waste dispo-
sal crisis can learn from the New Jersey legislature's expertise in this
field.
The federal government should promote the enactment of state toxic
waste legislation. Judicial deference to ECRA encourages other states
to enact similar statutes by giving them confidence that courts will not
allow violators to circumvent liability. Such a policy is particularly
necessary in the area of bankruptcy. Giving debtors a "fresh start" is a
shield. It should not be used as a sword.
Brian D. LeVay*
62. 469 U.S. at 286.
63. Id at 286. See also Note, supra note 17, at 358 n.153.
* J.D. 1988, Washington University
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